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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Brian B. and a class of similarly situated school-aged 
youths ("Plaintiffs") appeal the District Court's denial of 
their motion for a preliminary injunction barring 
enforcement of a Pennsylvania statute on constitutional 
grounds. The statute, 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 13-1306.2(a) 
("Subsection A"), limits the education available to youths 
convicted as adults and incarcerated in adult, county 
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correctional facilities. The Defendants are the Pennsylvania 
Department of Education ("DOE"), its secretary, and three 
local school districts. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
SS 1331 and 1343. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1). 
 
I. 
 
Pennsylvania law confers on youths between the ages of 
6 and 21 the right to a public education until the 
completion of high school. See 24 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, 
S 1301. In accordance with this statutory mandate, 
juveniles who have been adjudicated delinquent and youths 
who have been convicted as adults and sentenced to state 
correctional institutions receive full education programs. 
Subsection A, however, provides that youths convicted as 
adults and sentenced to adult, county facilities are only 
entitled to the minimal education provided to expelled 
students: 
 
       A person under twenty-one (21) years of age who is 
       confined to an adult local correctional institution 
       following conviction for a criminal offense who is 
       otherwise eligible for educational services as provided 
       under this act shall be eligible to receive educational 
       services from the board of school directors in the same 
       manner and to the same extent as a student who has 
       been expelled. . . . 
 
24 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 13-1306.2(a). County facilities are the 
only "local" ones. 
 
An expelled student under age 17 has a right to only 
minimal educational services (about 5 hours per week 
versus the usual 27.5 hours), and an expelled student 17 
or older is not entitled to education at all. See 22 Pa. Code 
S 12.6(e) (providing that expelled students under 17 are still 
entitled to education). As a result, Subsection A 
substantially limits, and for those 17 and over eliminates, 
the educational opportunities of youths convicted as adults 
and sentenced to adult, county correctional facilities. 
Although Subsection A treats these youths as if they were 
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expelled, there is no requirement that they be expelled or 
that their offenses be school-related. 
 
Subsection A thus differentiates between school-aged 
youths convicted as adults based upon the locale of their 
incarceration: state inmates receive a full education, while 
county inmates receive limited education. A youthful 
offender's place of incarceration depends on the length of 
sentence and in certain cases the discretion of the 
sentencing judge. Those sentenced to two years or less are 
confined in county facilities. Those sentenced tofive years 
or more go to state facilities. Sentences between two and 
five years can be served in either a county or state facility 
at the discretion of the sentencing judge. See  42 Pa. Const. 
Stat. S 9762. 
 
Pre-trial detainees and special education students are the 
only exceptions from Subsection A. As a result of a 
settlement agreement prompted by this case, all school- 
aged youths confined as pre-trial detainees receive a full 
educational program, as do all school-aged youths who 
require special education because of a disability. 
 
The District Court applied rational basis review under the 
Equal Protection Clause and concluded that the Plaintiffs 
had failed to show the reasonable probability of success on 
the merits necessary for a preliminary injunction. The 
Plaintiffs insist that because Subsection A burdens 
education, the statute warrants heightened scrutiny under 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Moreover, the Plaintiffs 
contend that even if Plyler's intermediate scrutiny does not 
apply, Subsection A also fails to pass constitutional muster 
under rational basis review. 
 
A district court considering a motion for preliminary 
injunction must decide: 
 
       (1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable 
       probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the 
       movant will be irreparably harmed by denial of the 
       relief; (3) whether granting preliminary relief will result 
       in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) 
       whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the 
       public interest. 
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Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (citing ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Bd. of 
Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1477 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc)). 
"We review a district court's [disposition] of a preliminary 
injunction according to a three-part standard. Legal 
conclusions are reviewed de novo, findings of fact are 
reviewed for clear error, and the `ultimate decision to grant 
or deny the preliminary injunction' is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion." ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 2000 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 14419, at *27 (3d Cir. June 22, 2000) (quoting 
Maldonado v. Houstoun, 157 F.3d 179, 183 (3d Cir. 1998), 
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1130 (1999)). 
 
II. 
 
We have held that the heightened scrutiny applied in 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), is limited to "unique 
circumstances" that are absent here: 
 
       In Plyler, the Supreme Court applied intermediate 
       scrutiny to a statute that prohibited the disbursement 
       of state funds for the education of the children of 
       undocumented aliens. Plyler, however, expressly 
       reaffirms the Court's holding in San Antonio 
       Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 
       (1973), that education is not a fundamental right and 
       therefore that burdens on education are not subject to 
       heightened scrutiny. It was the "unique circumstances" 
       of a burden on education coupled with the 
       disadvantaging of children of aliens that led to 
       heightened scrutiny in Plyler, and the Court 
       subsequently has expressly limited Plyler to those 
       circumstances. 
 
Philadelphia Police & Fire Assoc. for Handicapped Children, 
Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 874 F.2d 156, 165 (3d Cir. 
1989) (quoting Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 
U.S. 450, 459 (1988)). 
 
The Supreme Court has declined to extend Plyler's 
heightened scrutiny to other education cases. In Kadrmas, 
the Court addressed "the constitutionality under the 
fourteenth amendment equal protection clause of a school 
bus service user fee. The Court rejected Kadrmas' 
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contention that those who could not afford the fee were 
denied equal access to education and that such a denial 
implicated heightened scrutiny." Philadelphia Police & Fire 
Assoc. for Handicapped Children, 874 F.2d at 165 n.5. 
Notably, Kadrmas distinguished Plyler  on the ground that 
the children in Plyler were innocent victims of their parents' 
illegal immigration: 
 
        We have not extended [Plyler] beyond the "unique 
       circumstances" that provoked its unique confluence of 
       theories and rationales. Nor do we think that the case 
       before us today is governed by the holding in Plyler. 
       Unlike the children in that case, Sarita Kadrmas has 
       not been penalized by the government for illegal 
       conduct by her parents. 
 
Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 459 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
The youth covered by Subsection A are being punished 
as a result of their own illegal conduct, not because of the 
illegal conduct of their parents. Accordingly, the heightened 
scrutiny applied in Plyler is inappropriate here. Lacking a 
basis for heightened scrutiny, we must apply the rational 
basis review ordinarily applied to social and economic 
legislation. 
 
"[I]f a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor 
targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative 
classification so long as it bears a rational relationship to 
some legitimate end." Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 
(1996). "In the ordinary case, a law will be sustained if it 
can be said to advance a legitimate government interest, 
even if the law seems unwise or works to the disadvantage 
of a particular group, or if the rationale for it seems 
tenuous." Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. Indeed, under rational 
basis review, legislation enjoys a presumption of validity, 
and the plaintiff must negate every conceivable justification 
for the classification in order to prove that the classification 
is wholly irrational. See Federal Communications Comm'n v. 
Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1993). 
 
III. 
 
The Defendants tender four justifications for the 
distinction Subsection A draws between county and state, 
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adult institutions: "1) space limitations in county 
correctional institutions; 2) higher per-student cost in 
county correctional institutions; 3) security concerns that 
would arise in state correctional institutions if education 
were discontinued; and 4) the greater need for education in 
state correctional institutions, independent of security 
concerns." Appellant's Br. App. 34-35. 
 
First, the record indicates that 13 of the 73 adult, county 
correctional facilities in Pennsylvania do not have sufficient 
space to provide a complete educational program, and the 
legislature may have determined that requiring a full 
educational program in these institutions would require 
them to either preempt other services or to renovate at 
additional expense. Under rational basis review, a statute 
survives even if it is over-inclusive. Thus, if the legislature 
decides that space limitations in a fraction of the adult, 
county facilities justify the uniform limitation on education 
in adult, local facilities, that decision is not an irrational 
means of responding to the space concerns at some adult, 
local facilities. 
 
Second, although some adult, county facilities have more 
school-aged inmates than state institutions, state facilities 
generally have higher youth populations. As the DOE 
Secretary puts it, "the legislature may have intended to 
reduce average per-pupil expenditures by not providing 
education to correctional facilities that house few convicted 
offenders, where per-pupil costs might well be higher." 
Appellant's Br. App. 38. While Plaintiffs perceive an 
inconsistency between this rationale and the decision to 
require school districts to pay for the education of all 
school-aged pre-trial detainees, all special education 
students, and all inmates in juvenile detention, we agree 
with the Defendants that a reasonable legislator might find 
these choices compatible. It is not irrational to require 
education regardless of location for pre-trial detainees 
because the guilt of these defendants has not been 
adjudicated and they thus could be seen as retaining 
Pennsylvania's general right to education. The legislature 
could also view education for special needs students as 
having a higher priority than education generally. Finally, 
the per-pupil cost in juvenile facilities may rationally be 
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perceived as lower because the entire population is of 
school age. In each case, the necessity of legislative line- 
drawing "renders the precise coordinates of the resulting 
legislative judgment virtually unreviewable, since the 
legislature must be allowed leeway to approach a perceived 
problem incrementally." Beach Communications , 508 U.S. at 
316; see also Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 
U.S. 483, 489 (1955) ("Evils in the same field may be of 
different dimensions and proportions, requiring different 
remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or the reform 
may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase 
of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative 
mind. The legislature may select one phase of onefield and 
apply a remedy there, neglecting the others."). 
 
Third, the record indicates that before Subsection A was 
enacted, inmates in state correctional institutions received 
full educational services while school-aged county inmates 
did not. The Secretary suggests that curtailing education in 
state facilities would raise security concerns not similarly 
raised in county facilities. It is not irrational to believe that 
the discontinuation of an existing program is more likely to 
engender inmate hostility than the failure to institute one 
that inmates have never experienced. A perceived difference 
in security risks provides a rational basis for Section A's 
distinction between state and local institutions. 
 
Fourth, the legislature could have determined that the 
longer term youth population found in the state 
correctional system would benefit more from educational 
services than the more transient population found in 
county jails. An offender's term in a county correctional 
institution could be less than a school year, a situation that 
could not occur for a school-aged youth incarcerated in a 
state correctional institution. While it may be true, as 
Plaintiffs insist, that even short breaks in education can 
render a youth less likely to complete his education, a 
legislature's non-arbitrary judgment about educational 
priorities is not subject to judicial second-guessing. 
 
Thus, each of the justifications tendered by the 
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Defendants provides a rational basis for the distinctions 
drawn by Subsection A.1 
 
IV. 
 
Because the Plaintiffs have not shown a reasonable 
probability that the statute will be overturned, the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying their motion 
for preliminary injunction. The District Court's order of 
June 17, 1999, will be affirmed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. This fact distinguishes this case from Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996), the Supreme Court's most recent case applying rational basis 
review and invalidating a statute on equal protection grounds. The Court 
there struck down a Colorado constitutional amendment barring the 
adoption -- and mandating the repeal -- of any state or local law 
specifically protecting homosexuals from discrimination. The Court 
explained that the amendment identified a classification of persons by a 
single trait and then disadvantaged that group "across the board" in all 
situations. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. Because the amendment was "a 
status-based enactment divorced from any factual context," it was not 
possible to "discern a relationship to [any] legitimate state interests." 
Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. In contrast, juveniles convicted as adults and 
held in adult, county correctional facilities are not a group identified 
by 
a single trait, and the burden imposed on them by Subsection A is 
limited to a specific educational context that, as we have shown, enables 
us to discern a rational connection with legitimate state interests. 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
I agree with the majority that the proper standard of 
review for this case is rational basis scrutiny. I disagree, 
however, that Subsection A, which restricts the educational 
opportunities available to school-age county inmates, 
survives a rational basis review. In my view, Pennsylvania's 
treatment of this category of prisoners is arbitrary and 
violates equal protection. For that reason, I respectfully 
dissent. 
 
I. 
 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits a State from "deny[ing] to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. 
Const. amend. XIV, S 1. Its central tenet requires that 
States treat like cases alike but may treat unlike cases 
differently. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). To 
determine whether a particular classification meets this 
obligation, courts examine, with varying levels of scrutiny, 
the relationship between the government's objective and the 
means to achieve it. Absent the singling out of a suspect 
class, such as race or gender, or the infringement of a 
fundamental right, courts apply the minimal level of 
scrutiny -- rational basis review. 
 
The rational basis standard requires that a State express 
a rational relationship between the classification and some 
legitimate government interest. I recognize that this 
standard poses a nearly insurmountable hurdle to parties 
challenging a particular statute, requiring them to prove 
that there is no rational relationship, actual or hypothetical, 
between the stated end and the classification. See FCC v. 
Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993). 
Moreover, statutory classifications may be drawn so that 
"reform may take one step at a time," permitting the 
legislature to "select one phase of one field and apply a 
remedy there, neglecting others." Williamson v. Lee Optical 
of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). 
 
In finding that Subsection A passes rational basis 
scrutiny, the majority relies almost exclusively on Lee 
Optical and Beach Communications, Inc., each of which 
 
                                11 
  
reviewed the scope of economic regulation. As the majority 
observes, legislation that does not target a suspect class or 
infringe a fundamental right enjoys a presumption of 
validity and federal courts ought to tread lightly when 
reviewing a statute under this standard. See Maj. Op. at 7. 
Yet the majority's analysis bends too far to accommodate 
this standard. 
 
I am aware of what rational basis review precludes. 
Under Lee Optical and its progeny, a court cannot second- 
guess the legislature's wisdom or its policy judgment. A 
court would overstep its boundaries if it were to invalidate 
a law because it thought the law was bad for the 
community or because it believed that, in light of competing 
record evidence offering support for two options, the 
legislature made the wrong choice. See Beach 
Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. at 314 ("[J]udicial 
intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how 
unwisely [a court] may think a political branch has acted."). 
Nevertheless, making a legislative judgment "virtually 
unreviewable," id. at 316, does not make it nonjusticiable. 
Yet this is the practical effect of the majority's terse 
treatment of the Plaintiffs' plight. 
 
There are limits to the deference owed to the legislature. 
As the Plaintiffs point out, the Supreme Court has applied 
rational basis scrutiny more circumspectly when legislation 
impinges on sensitive issues or controversial social policies. 
In such cases, the legislative classification must"find some 
footing in the realities of the subject addressed by the 
legislation." Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993) 
(upholding Kentucky law imposing different burdens of 
proof for civil and criminal involuntary commitment 
procedures). Moreover, the State may not "rely on a 
classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so 
attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or 
irrational." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 
U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (invalidating municipal ordinance 
requiring special use permit only for proposed group home 
for mentally retarded but not for other group homes). If the 
classification is motivated by invidious discrimination or if 
there is too flimsy a relationship between the means 
employed and the purported end, a court would be well 
within its authority to invalidate such a classification: 
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       The search for the link between classification and 
       objective gives substance to the Equal Protection 
       Clause; it provides guidance and discipline for the 
       legislature, which is entitled to know what sorts of laws 
       it can pass; and it marks the limits of our authority. 
       . . . By requiring that the classification bear a rational 
       relationship to an independent and legitimate 
       legislative end, we ensure that classifications are not 
       drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group 
       burdened by the law. 
 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-33 (1996) (invalidating 
Colorado ban on any official action designed to protect 
homosexuals from discrimination). 
 
Subsection A's disparate treatment of school-age county 
inmates demonstrates a disconnect between the 
classification and its purported objective for several 
reasons. Most importantly, Pennsylvania law entitles 
individuals between 6 and 21 years of age to a free public 
education through high school. See 24 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 
13, S 1301. Rights and benefits provided by a state law are 
subject to applicable constitutional constraint. See 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (requiring due 
process before termination of individual's federal and state 
welfare benefits). Although a state is not obligated to 
provide its citizens benefits such as education, when it 
elects to do so, it may not deny that benefit to some citizens 
for arbitrary reasons. See Griffin v. Illinois , 351 U.S. 12 
(1956) (invalidating state law that required purchase of 
transcript as precondition to appeal because no rational 
relationship between indigence and guilt). Moreover, while 
education is not a fundamental right, laws affecting 
education may be distinguished from other social legislation 
because of education's "importance . . . in maintaining our 
basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its deprivation 
on the life of the child." Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221. Thus, we 
ought not to allow education to be curtailed arbitrarily. 
 
In addition, concern that an unpopular group is being 
singled out for discrimination is a cornerstone of equal 
protection analysis. See United States v. Carolene Products 
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153 n. 4 (1938). While we do not 
consider prisoners a suspect class, they represent a group 
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to whom the legislature has limited political accountability. 
Yet political accountability is central to rational basis 
review: 
 
       The Constitution presumes that . . . even improvident 
       decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic 
       process and that judicial intervention is generally 
       unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a 
       political branch has acted. 
 
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (upholding 
mandatory retirement age of 60 for Foreign Service 
employees). Thus, while certainly not requiring a 
heightened level of scrutiny, even under rational basis 
review, limited political accountability obligates a court to 
"insist on knowing the relation between the classification 
adopted and the object to be attained." Romer , 517 U.S. at 
632. 
 
Finally, the interest the State promotes must be 
legitimate. Invidious discrimination -- whether motivated 
by antipathy or by a desire to harm a politically impotent 
group -- is an illegitimate aim. See Cleburne , 473 U.S. at 
447. Sometimes, an improper motive is obvious. In 
Cleburne, it was the neighborhood's negative attitudes 
toward and fear of the mentally retarded. See id. at 448. In 
United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 
(1973), it was Congress's ulterior motive to prevent 
"hippies" from participating in the food stamp program. See 
id. at 534. Unlike Cleburne and Moreno, here we have no 
"smoking gun" that proves antipathy toward county- 
incarcerated, school-age prisoners. The cursory 
explanations that Pennsylvania's DOE offers to justify 
Subsection A's classifications, however, especially in 
reference to an important benefit like education, suggest an 
apathy that borders on antipathy. As such, Subsection A's 
isolation of this particular group of school-age inmates 
awakens my skepticism. 
 
II. 
 
Applying these concepts of rational basis review to 
Subsection A, I find that the Pennsylvania DOE relies on 
inconsistent, piecemeal rationalizations to justify its 
 
                                14 
  
categorization that cordons off this single group of youth 
offenders. The application of Subsection A createsfive 
different categories of school-age inmates: county- 
incarcerated school-age inmates; state-incarcerated school- 
age inmates; pre-trial school-age detainees, wherever 
housed; school-age inmates requiring special education, 
wherever housed; and inmates of the juvenile detention 
system. Only county-incarcerated school-age inmates are 
treated as "expelled students." See 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 13- 
1306.2(a). I find that this categorization and the 
rationalizations offered for it lack "some footing in the 
realities of the subject addressed by the legislation." Heller, 
509 U.S. at 321. A review of each of these classifications 
illustrates their arbitrariness. 
 
The first classification is the distinction, on which the 
majority concentrates, between school-age convicts 
incarcerated in county facilities and those placed in state 
facilities. The Pennsylvania DOE offers four objectives to 
justify this distinction: (1) inadequate county facilities, (2) 
higher per-student costs to educate inmates confined to 
county facilities, (3) a comparatively greater need to educate 
state-incarcerated, school-age prisoners, and (4) security 
concerns in state facilities. I find that none of these 
justifications supports the denial to school-age county 
inmates of the educational benefits that their counterparts 
in state facilities receive. 
 
With respect to the first justification, the Pennsylvania 
DOE does not argue that the county facilities have no 
space, only that it could be inconvenient for a few facilities 
to reschedule other programs or, in some instances, to 
accommodate the schooling of more school-age convicts. 
Obviously, however, these facilities have some space for 
educational use because classes are provided for pre-trial 
detainees and for special education students. Moreover, the 
space available must be flexible because the number of 
inmates presently eligible for schooling may fluctuate from 
day to day. There is no indication that the other school-age 
inmates in county facilities cannot be accommodated in 
that same space. Furthermore, when considering 
scheduling problems, the nature and impact of what is 
being scheduled cannot be ignored. I would hope that the 
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scheduling of space for educational programs would be 
given some priority. 
 
While rational basis review may not require a State to 
prove its justifications, it does afford challengers the 
opportunity to rebut these justifications. See Beach 
Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. at 315. In my view, the 
Plaintiffs have rebutted the "inadequate space" justification. 
 
As for the second reason, the higher per-student cost in 
county facilities, a closer look also reveals its irrationality. 
Were Pennsylvania DOE really concerned about lowering 
the average cost of inmate education, no county inmates 
would be educated. The DOE tries to articulate why it is 
willing to incur higher costs for some county inmates, but 
not for others. First, it argues that pre-trial detainees, as 
opposed to convicted school-age inmates, may be educated 
because they have yet to be proven guilty. Not only is that 
rationale unrelated to the purported per-student cost 
objective, but it suggests that convicted state inmates 
should also be denied education, something the Plaintiffs 
have not requested.1 Second, the DOE argues that special 
education students are required by federal law, 2 not state 
law, to receive a free education. But an obligation, arising 
under a federal statute, does not justify the arbitrary 
elimination of the state's own obligation to provide 
education to one group of students and not to another. 
Moreover, it begs the question why state-incarcerated 
inmates, who do not have learning disabilities, should be 
educated. In fact, given that the Pennsylvania DOE is 
educating two categories of school-age county inmates, it is 
more likely to achieve economies of scale and lower per- 
student cost by educating all three categories of school-age 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Whether guilt is relevant to retaining educational benefits raises a 
different question: What is rational about imposing an additional 
punishment on an inmate solely based on where he is incarcerated? 
Because Plaintiffs have not suggested, however, that the denial of 
education is an ex post facto punishment, I merely pose this question 
rhetorically. 
 
2. School-age individuals with special education needs are generally 
entitled to have their needs met through individualized educational 
programs at the state's expense under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act. See 20 U.S.C. S 1400 et seq. 
 
                                16 
  
county inmates, rather than only the two. Moreover, 
technological developments, such as closed-circuit 
television, can facilitate the providing of educational 
programs at a lower per-student cost, whether one, two, or 
three categories of inmates are selected to receive those 
programs. 
 
Fiscal integrity is a legitimate goal. States may not, 
however, achieve that goal by making invidious or arbitrary 
distinctions. See Zoebel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61-62 
(1982) (invalidating Alaska dividend distribution program 
because it favored established over new state residents). By 
randomly demonstrating a willingness to assume education 
costs for some county prisoners but not for others, the 
Pennsylvania DOE's rationales become arbitrary, and thus 
impermissible.3 
 
The third objective, the greater need to educate inmates 
in state facilities, fails too for the reasons Plaintiffs assert. 
First, the argument that the county inmate population is 
too transient is subverted by the Pennsylvania DOE's 
decision to educate an even more transient class-- pre- 
trial detainees. Second, the notion that state inmates are 
incarcerated longer and thus are less likely to return to 
their education after their release from confinement is 
belied by the Plaintiffs' data. See e.g., 11/25/97 Tr. at 5- 
12; 83-88; Stipulated Facts P 5, P 54,P 59 (describing 
harmful effects of break in education of even one year). 
Third, this rationale is undermined by the fact that it is the 
sentencing judge who determines whether school-age 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Plaintiffs also assert that the cost argument is a red herring because 
the school districts receive an allocation to cover educational costs for 
all 
students residing in a particular district, including those incarcerated 
in 
a county correctional facility. See Appellant's Br. at 46-49. See also 24 
Pa. Cons. Stat. S 13-1306.2(c) which appears to bear out this assertion: 
 
       (c) The department shall effectuate necessary procedures for the 
       transfer of funds from the school district of residence to the 
school 
       district in which the local correctional institution is located. In 
       effectuating the transfer of funds, the department may deduct the 
       appropriate amount from the Basic Education Funding allocation of 
       any school district which had resident students who were provided 
       educational services in the local correctional facility. 
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inmates, convicted as adults and sentenced to between two 
and five years, will be confined in a state or county facility. 
Thus, there will be some inmates in county facilities who 
are serving the same sentence as state inmates but not 
receiving the same educational benefit -- and the only 
reason for the differential treatment is the discretion of the 
sentencing judge.4 Combined, these inconsistencies make 
this objective not only arbitrary but fallacious. 
 
The fourth objective, concern for security in state 
facilities, is irrelevant in the context of this case. As the 
District Court concluded, whatever the merits of 
Pennsylvania's overall concern about the role education 
plays in promoting security in state facilities, the Plaintiffs 
are not requesting that we deny state inmates their 
educational benefits. See Brian B., et al. v. Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania, 51 F. Supp. 2d 611, 633 (E.D. Pa. 1999). 
 
In sum, the Pennsylvania DOE's purported objectives are 
undermined by its decision to deny the educational benefits 
to county-incarcerated, school-age inmates that it is willing 
to provide to pre-trial detainees and to special education 
inmates in the same facilities. The reasons for 
distinguishing this category of school-age inmates in the 
county facilities are so unrelated to the purported objectives 
of limited space and higher per-student cost that they can 
only be arbitrary. As a result, the broader distinction 
between state and county inmates cannot itself withstand 
the limited scrutiny that rational basis review applies. 
These flawed justifications bear as little rational 
relationship to the statutory classification at hand as the 
reasons offered by the City of Cleburne to justify its 
differential treatment of the mentally retarded. See 
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448-50. 
 
Finally, Plaintiffs attack the two remaining classifications: 
expelled students and convicted juvenile delinquents. The 
link to expelled students -- apparently Pennsylvania's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Under Pennsylvania law, felons sentenced to up to two years are 
housed in county facilities, those with sentences offive years or more are 
confined to state facilities, and those sentenced to between two and five 
years may be incarcerated in either facility at the sentencing judge's 
discretion. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 9762. 
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attempt to insulate Subsection A from challenge-- grants 
county-incarcerated, school-age inmates, under 17 years of 
age, the same minimal education benefits that expelled 
students receive.5 Yet, these two groups of school-age 
individuals are not similarly situated and thus should not 
be treated alike. A student is expelled from school when he 
violates school rules. As a consequence of his violation of 
school rules, an expelled student is denied a publicly 
funded education, a quid pro quo. He can still, however, 
obtain an education at his own expense. It is very unlikely, 
however, that the offense underlying the conviction of a 
county-incarcerated, school-age inmate was a violation of 
school rules. Moreover, county-incarcerated, school-age 
inmates cannot obtain an alternative education, privately 
funded or not, while in prison; and the reason for the 
denial of state-provided education is probably not related to 
the inmate's underlying offense. Thus, the relationship 
between expelled students and school-age county inmates 
is so attenuated as to render its linkage irrational. 
 
Similarly, the distinction between confined juveniles and 
school-age county inmates lacks foundation. The District 
Court concluded that the juvenile justice system-- as a 
distinct penal system -- is primarily concerned with 
rehabilitation, so that providing its inmates an education 
furthers its primary objective. See Brian B., 51 F. Supp. 2d 
at 630 n.23. While sensible, this explanation does not go on 
to explain why state-incarcerated, school-age inmates 
convicted as adults receive education but county- 
incarcerated ones do not. For that reason, the explanation 
must fail. 
 
None of the objectives the Pennsylvania DOE offers can 
justify its isolating this one group of school-age county 
inmates. I find that the Plaintiffs have done what rational 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Expelled students under 17 years of age must receive a minimum 
education benefit while those over 17 years of age lose their entitlement 
to any education. See Pa. Code S 12.6(e). The local school districts have 
discretion to decide what constitutes the minimal benefit. See Ambreski 
v. Southeastern Sch. Dist. Bd. of Directors, 421 A.2d 485, 488 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1980). This minimum amount ranges from as little as 90 
minutes a week to a maximum of 5 hours a week. See Brian B, et al., 51 
F. Supp. 2d at 617-18. 
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basis review requires of them: They have demonstrated that 
there is no rational relationship between the statutory 
classification and the purported government objectives. See 
Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. at 315 ("[T]hose 
attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have 
the burden `to negative every conceivable basis which might 
support it.' ") (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts, 
Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)). As a result, I would hold 
that Subsection A denies this class of school-age county 
inmates equal protection of the law. 
 
III. 
 
The majority characterizes the Pennsylvania DOE's set of 
piecemeal justifications as falling within Lee Optical's "one 
step at a time" rubric, which permits a legislature to 
conclude that only part of a problem needs to be solved 
initially, and under which courts defer to the legislature's 
discretion to decide which part that is. See Maj. Op. at 8-9. 
But the seeming coherence of this incremental approach is 
illusory. As the analysis above demonstrates, the rationales 
for distinguishing among county inmates are unrelated to 
cost and space. Nor do Pennsylvania's other purported 
reasons, such as inmate guilt or student expulsion, suggest 
an alternative policy or evil to link these disparate 
categories that set county-incarcerated, school-age inmates 
apart. 
 
Nevertheless, despite the absence of a "reasonably 
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational 
basis" for the categories, see Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 (citing 
Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. at 313), the majority 
upholds the classifications with no more than a perfunctory 
review. See Maj. Op. at 7-10. As I read the cases, even 
when applying rational basis scrutiny, our task of 
"adjudication is not a mechanical exercise nor does it 
compel `either/or' determinations." See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 
26 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Thus, while Lee Optical 
and Beach Communications, Inc., give states a wide berth to 
craft solutions to policy problems "one step at a time," they 
do not forbid our review of challenged social or economic 
legislation. 
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In conclusion, a state is not obligated by the federal 
Constitution to provide its citizens with a free public 
education. Once it decides to do so, however, it may not 
arbitrarily deny some of its citizen access to this benefit. In 
Pennsylvania's case, its hodgepodge of justifications for 
treating school-age county inmates differently than every 
other conceivable category of school-age prisoners, in adult 
or juvenile confinement, and treating them like expelled 
students, with whom they share no rational connection, 
amounts to just this type of prohibited arbitrary denial. As 
Justice Jackson once wisely observed, "we are much more 
likely to find arbitrariness in the regulation of the few than 
of the many." Railway Express Agency, 336 U.S. at 113. 
Pennsylvania's restriction of education to county- 
incarcerated, school-age inmates aptly proves this point. 
 
I believe, therefore, that the Plaintiffs have shown a 
likelihood of success on the merits. Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent and would remand this case to the 
District Court for it to determine whether the Plaintiffs have 
satisfied the other elements required for a preliminary 
injunction.6 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Because the District Court concluded that the Plaintiffs were unlikely 
to prevail on the merits, it refrained from evaluating the other elements 
required for a preliminary injunction. See Brian B., 51 F. Supp. 2d at 
635. 
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